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Abstract: Conventional wisdom holds that international political pressure and domestic civil 
unrest in the mid-1970s and 1980s brought an end to apartheid in South Africa. I show that, prior 
to these events, labor market pressure in the late 1960s/early 1970s caused a dramatic unraveling 
of apartheid in the workplace. Increased educational attainment among whites reduced resistance 
to opening semi-skilled jobs to Africans. This institutional change reflected white economic 
preferences rather than a relaxation of attitudes toward apartheid. I show that whites benefited 
from the relaxation of job reservation rules and that this is the primary cause of black 
occupational advancement.  
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: N37 J71 
 
 
Introduction 
South Africa’s remarkable transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994 is often 
attributed to have resulted from an increase in international and domestic political opposition 
from the mid-1970s onwards.3 Apartheid, in place from 1950 until 1994, imposed a series of 
social and economic measures that separated South Africa’s four racial groups (namely Africans, 
Coloureds, Indians and whites). As a matter of fact, one important liberalization, the 
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desegregation of the labor market, occurred at the height of apartheid suggesting that its causes 
were different from those resulting in the final dismantling of apartheid. Labor markets had 
already begun to desegregate by the late 1960s.  
I provide empirical evidence that by the 1970s, labor market restrictions were already 
loosening at the behest – and to the benefit – of white workers. Using extensive micro data from 
the 1970 and 1980 population censuses, I document the marked improvements in the educational 
and occupational attainment of whites, particularly the historically less well-educated Afrikaans 
speakers. As long as the majority white Afrikaans speakers were poorly educated, they and the 
equally poorly educated Africans were substitutable, thus competing for the same low-skilled 
occupations. However, as whites moved into the more skilled occupations, an increase in African 
employment in semi-skilled jobs was needed to maintain skilled incomes as the supply of white 
skilled workers increased.  
Aggregate employment data from the South African manufacturing censuses and 
manpower surveys indicate a consequent liberalization in the racial allocation of jobs (job 
reservation) demonstrated by an increase in the employment of African workers in semi-skilled 
occupations by the late 1960s. Skilled whites, in contrast, continued to be protected from African 
competition because of their educational advantage. The result was that desegregation was 
limited to semi-skilled occupations.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, economic literature claimed that apartheid, particularly 
labor market apartheid, could not survive due to the constraints it placed on the economy 
(Steenkamp, 1971), yet the government continued to state its commitment to the system. This 
commitment is worth noting since it demonstrates the government’s support of white workers in 
white worker decision making regarding job reservation, despite acknowledged economic costs. 
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The commitment also provides evidence that it could only have been white workers who initiated 
the transformation that took place in the labor market and not political pressure, capitalist 
pressure or state intervention as is commonly believed.  
This paper contributes to the literature on labor market discrimination by showing that 
despite a government’s support of segregation, consideration should be given to the economic 
interests of the workers. The conventional belief espoused by Becker (1954) is that segregation is 
costly and will ultimately be competed away in the long run due to its inefficiency, unless the 
government props it up by law or in practice. However, Heckman (1989) shows that labor 
market rigidities such as collective action (for example, through the use of violence) may prevent 
firms from desegregating even though the government doesn’t explicitly support discrimination. 
The South African environment during apartheid shows that white workers did act collectively 
but their preference for segregation was overshadowed by their preference for higher incomes 
and this occurred despite explicit government support for segregation.    
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section I provide detail on the institutional 
arrangement that enabled white determination of the racial job allocation process in South Africa 
during apartheid. In Section 2 I propose a model showing how changes in white educational 
outcomes might lead to changes in job allocation. Section 3 describes the data. In section 4 I 
present facts that support the proposed theory (inconsistent with accepted explanations of 
desegregation). I detail the large increase in white educational attainment, the consequent 
improved white employment outcomes and the resultant desegregation of semi-skilled 
occupations. I show that desegregation did not coincide with economic growth, economic 
downturns, employment growth or any changes in African educational attainment. Section 5 
concludes.  
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1. Institutional Framework 
At the beginning of the twentieth century racial policy in South Africa affected three 
major groups. The first group was the non-white, predominantly African, population, which, by 
1969, constituted 80.7 % of the population (Ballinger 1969). Due to discrimination during the 
colonial period as well as a lack of economic development, by the turn of the century, the 
African population (68.3 % of the population of South Africa) was for the most part poorly 
educated (Table 3). The much smaller Coloured and Indian groups (12.4 % of the population) 
were only slightly better educated.4 The second major group was the Afrikaans component of the 
white population. Afrikaans speakers made up around 60 % of the white population, some 19.3 
% of South Africa’s total population at the time. Due to its wide yet thin geographic dispersal 
throughout the interior of South Africa, this group had limited access to education during the 
nineteenth century and therefore was on average poorly educated (Table 2). At the turn of the 
century, war and agricultural hardship forced both groups to migrate to urban areas in search of 
employment. In contrast to the non-whites and white Afrikaans speakers, the English speaking 
whites had the highest level of educational attainment (Table 2). Differences in the level of 
education between the two white groups led to differences in economic opportunities (such as 
type of employment and income). These differences determined the direction of South African 
politics throughout the twentieth century.    
By virtue of its size, the Afrikaans speaking component of the white population came to 
dominate South African politics upon unification in 1910, since non-whites had very limited 
political representation and English speaking whites constituted only a small component of the 
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white community (Lipton 1985, Thompson 1995, Feinstein 2005). When the Afrikaans worker-
supported National Party came to power and implemented apartheid in 1948, it legalized the 
practice of reserving certain occupations in the manufacturing sector for whites (Horrell 1969, 
Horrell 1978, Omond 1986). The government did this by handing the right to determine the 
racial allocation of jobs to whites through the Industrial Conciliation (IC) Act of 1956. The IC 
Act established an industrial relations framework that enabled trade unions and employers’ 
organizations to negotiate industrial labor contracts that specified which jobs went to the 
different race groups. Furthermore, the Act required unions to be racially segregated and 
excluded Africans from formal trade union representation. The consequence of this trade union 
segregation was that white unions were able to negotiate the exclusion of Africans from 
occupations that attracted large numbers of whites, a process known as job reservation. 
Negotiators created a skill classification for every occupation in an industry, then ranked the 
occupations by skill level, and finally, allocated the lowest skilled jobs to non-whites and the 
higher skilled jobs to whites. Evidence from the negotiation process indicates that decisions on 
the skill requirement were fairly arbitrary and depended more on which whites found those jobs 
to be attractive than on skills per se.  
The practical outcome of this policy was to provide the labor market with a certain 
amount of flexibility in terms of job reservation determinations. The ultimate determinant of job 
reservation was the relative quantity of white workers available for employment in a particular 
occupation. Depending on the supply of white workers at each labor agreement, trade unions and 
employers would renegotiate the jobs to be reserved. via Section 77 of the IC Act which allowed 
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the government to declare an occupation reserved on behalf of whites forced firms to comply 
with the unions under threat of state intervention.5  
The apartheid era education policy promoted white education, while forcing African 
education to stagnate, resulting in a decreasing supply of low-skilled white workers in semi-
skilled manufacturing jobs as whites (specifically Afrikaans speakers) moved to higher-paying, 
higher-skill jobs and industries. At the same time, the demand for semi-skilled workers in 
manufacturing was increasing, both to replace the departing white workers and as a result of 
industry growth. With the renegotiation of each labor agreement, white trade unions were 
relinquishing some of the less popular semi-skilled occupations. The 1967 labor agreement 
between the metal and engineering industry and the relevant trade unions demonstrates the 
process of renegotiation.6 The industry had been experiencing declining numbers of whites in 
certain occupations by the mid-1960s. In 1967 the trade unions agreed to classify some of the 
high demand occupations as lower-skilled so that they could be opened up to non-whites (Horrell 
1969). Other industries experiencing similar changes by the late 1960s were the motor vehicle, 
clothing, footwear and leather, and furniture industries and the meat trade (Horrell, 1969). The 
resultant new industry agreements which first appeared in the late 1960s provide evidence of the 
desegregation of semi-skilled occupations. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
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In this section, I discuss the economic incentives encouraging whites to open up semi-
skilled jobs to Africans. Consider a two sector economy, one employing only unskilled workers, 
and another employing both semi-skilled and skilled workers. Call these sectors mining and 
manufacturing. I assume that the difference in skill level between unskilled and semi-skilled 
occupations is only that semi-skilled workers receive on-the-job training. There is no difference 
in the formal education requirements for semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. Let whites have 
complete control over the allocation of occupations and let the majority of white workers be 
poorly educated as was the case in South African manufacturing at the advent of apartheid (see 
section 4).  
I assume that workers care only about their wage and abstract from preferences for 
segregation among members of the workforce.7 Poorly skilled white workers will compete with 
poorly skilled African workers unless they can reserve occupations for themselves. To protect 
themselves from competition with Africans, whites therefore employ the mechanism provided in 
the IC Act to reserve the best occupations. I assume that the semi-skilled manufacturing jobs are 
more pleasant than mining jobs and that therefore white workers choose to work in 
manufacturing and African workers are forced into mining (with skilled whites working in the 
skilled manufacturing occupations).  
Let each industry consist of one representative firm operating with a constant-returns-to-
scale CES production function. The production technology of the mining industry is given by: 
 
λλλ /1))1(( UaaKY u −+=  , 0 < λ < 1  
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where U denotes unskilled workers who are African and Ku denotes capital employed in the 
mining industry. Unskilled labor and capital are complements. a is a parameter governing 
income shares and λ is a parameter governing the elasticity of substitution between unskilled 
labor and capital equipment. The production technology of the manufacturing sector is 
represented by: 
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where M denotes semi-skilled workers, S denotes skilled workers, both of whom are white at this 
stage, and Km denotes capital employed in the manufacturing industry. S and M are complements 
in the production process. b and c are parameters governing income shares and α and γ are 
parameters governing the elasticity of substitution between semi-skilled and skilled labor and 
capital equipment.8 Since the firms are operating in a competitive environment under constant-
returns-to-scale, the factor prices are given by the marginal products and because MPs ≥ MPm ≥ 
MPu it follows that Ws ≥ Wm ≥ Wu.  
The ratio of the two marginal products of labor in manufacturing gives the skill premium:  
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which is positively related to increases in the ratio of semi-skilled to skilled workers and 
negatively related to decreases in the ratio.  
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 Figure 1 demonstrates the role of the skill premium in determining the supply of semi-
skilled workers. The horizontal axis represents the total number of semi-skilled workers 
employed in manufacturing while the vertical axis represents the total number of skilled workers 
in manufacturing. I assume that the total availability of white workers remains constant. A white 
worker can either be a skilled worker or a semi-skilled worker. Line AA, with slope = 1, 
represents the total number of white semi-skilled and skilled workers. At point A0 all white 
workers are skilled and at point A1 all white workers are semi-skilled, any other point along the 
line represents a combination of semi-skilled and skilled in the industry. Ray W1 from the origin 
is a level curve representing a constant skill premium. A steeper line to the left of W1 indicates a 
lower skill premium, while a flatter line to the right indicates a higher skill premium. Assume 
that in period 1 there are few skilled workers and many white semi-skilled workers such that the 
skill premium is given by line W1, with S1 skilled workers and M1 semi-skilled workers. The 
high number of white semi-skilled workers means semi-skilled workers have the power to 
prevent the skill premium from increasing any further. They do this by reserving semi-skilled 
jobs for whites.9 At the same time, the high skill premium provides workers with an incentive to 
become educated and become skilled workers. The increase in skilled workers leads to S2 skilled 
workers and M2 semi-skilled workers with a decrease in the skill premium to W2. However now 
there are sufficient skilled workers to override the preferences of white semi-skilled workers and 
to prevent the skill premium from declining. As a result, the skilled workers force the opening up 
of semi-skilled jobs to Africans. The increase in the supply of semi-skilled workers leads to an 
drives the skill premium back up to W1 with an increase in the number of semi-skilled workers 
from M2 to M3, all of whom are African. In this way skilled workers are able to keep the skill 
premium at W1. This exposition can be extended to an industry with many occupation levels - as 
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long as whites move up the occupation scale, they have an incentive to open up the lower skilled 
occupations in order to maintain their skill premium.10  
 
3. Data  
To determine the effect of white control of segregation on African employment I use both 
individual census data from the South African population censuses of 1970 and 1980 and 
aggregate data from the South African manufacturing census and South African manpower 
surveys. The 1970 population census is the earliest possible dataset showing the effects of 
apartheid education and labor policies on individual outcomes. Two censuses were undertaken, 
one for whites, Coloureds and Indians and the second, with far less questions, for Africans. The 
census data contain information on race, gender, age, income (not for Africans in 1970), 
education, employment status, occupation, industry of employment, class of worker and region. 
11
 
I supplement the occupation information in the census data with an index linking 
education to income through occupation type, developed by Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman 
(1992), which I call a Socio-Economic Occupation (SEO) index. The rank ranges from a low of 
17 for agricultural workers to a high of 90 for judges.12 The occupations listed in the South 
African population census correspond to the 2-digit International Occupation Standard (IOS) 
classification. I assign each occupation its corresponding SEO index number such that the SEO 
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index number gives an indication of an occupation’s skill level where higher ranked occupations 
demonstrate a higher skill requirement. 
The South African Manpower Surveys conducted by the Department of Labor (biennially 
from 1969 to 1985, except for 1979) record the number of employees by race and gender for 271 
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled occupations of laborers ranging across all industries (it 
excludes agricultural workers and domestic servants). The survey groups the occupations into 16 
categories, ranging from highly skilled professionals (such as doctors and accountants) to semi-
skilled workers (such as machine operators) and unskilled laborers. I use the SEO index to rank 
the occupations in the manpower surveys by their skill requirement. The white collar 
occupational breakdown corresponds to the IOS classification. However, in the manpower 
surveys, the occupations in the semi-skilled categories are idiosyncratic to the job restriction 
policies within the South African labor market and as a result, differ from the IOS 
classification.13  
The final data set, the manufacturing census, conducted by the Central Statistical Service 
(yearly from 1950 to 1960 and then every two or three years until 1985 at which point the 
surveys no longer provide a racial breakdown of wages), consists of employment figures for each 
of the four race groups for both production workers and salaried administrators in 23 3-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification manufacturing industries. In addition, the census reports the 
total wage bill for each industry for each of the four racial groups as well as the capital stock and 
gross output. By the 1970s, manufacturing was the largest industry in the economy both in terms 
of employment and output (Feinstein 2005). It was the industry the National Party targeted to 
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solve the poor white unemployment problem and as such was the industry most influenced by 
the IC Act.  
 
4. Evidence 
The model in section 2 suggests that desegregation could only occur after a certain level 
of white educational attainment and a corresponding shift of white employment to skilled 
occupations had taken place. If these conditions are satisfied, we should see some desegregation 
in semi-skilled occupations in order to maintain the skill premium. Furthermore, under the 
constraint that only white workers could determine job reservation, changes in economic 
conditions, such as industry output growth, should have had no impact on desegregation. Neither 
should any potential changes in African characteristics, such as an increase in African education, 
have played any role in desegregation. Finally, the model suggests that while desegregation 
could take place in semi-skilled jobs, segregation would have remained between skilled and 
semi-skilled jobs. 
The first step toward testing the theory is to determine whether white workers did indeed 
experience increased educational attainment, as one might expect under the apartheid education 
policy. The next step is to determine whether an increase in the employment of whites in higher 
skilled occupations followed the increase in white educational attainment. The third step is to 
determine whether the white shift in employment was followed by desegregation of the semi-
skilled occupations. 
Education 
By 1970 the majorities of both white language groups were completing their education in 
the important last three years of high school (completion of the last three years entitled a person 
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to a school leaving certificate making it easier to find employment), whereas 85% of Africans 
had never been enrolled in high school (see Table 1). Although, Afrikaans speakers were on 
average less educated than English speakers, with a higher proportion of the latter obtaining the 
matriculation (high school completion) certificate.  
Breaking education into attainment by birth cohort, Table 2 shows that the major shift in 
white English speakers’ attainment was from the earliest two years to the last three years of high 
school. In contrast, Afrikaans educational attainment rose rapidly during the twentieth century, 
consistent with the policies of the National Party. While the oldest cohort had obtained 
predominantly primary school education, by 1970 around 60% of the sample had attained at least 
the third year of high school and over 20% received a matriculation certificate. The percentage 
obtaining tertiary education also increased yet the most significant improvements were in the 
number of students remaining in high school beyond the first two years.   
During the twentieth century, the gap between whites and Africans had widened (see 
Table 3). There were minor improvements in African education - for those born between 1871-
1884, 80% had obtained no education, this number had decreased to 37% for those born between 
1945 and 1954. However, a full 43% of the youngest cohort received no more than some primary 
school education by 1970. Furthermore, the percentage of high school attendees never rose 
above 20%. This finding is consistent with Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz  (2000) and Knight and 
McGrath (1977).  
These findings suggest that while both white and African educational attainment had 
been increasing throughout the twentieth century, improvements in educational attainment were 
much higher for whites. Furthermore, the rate of increase was higher for Afrikaans speakers than 
for English speakers, suggesting convergence of Afrikaans to English speakers by 1970. 
14 
 
White Occupations 
Did whites, particularly Afrikaans speakers, move to higher ranked occupations as white 
education improved over time? I divide whites into English and Afrikaans speaking males to 
demonstrate occupational rank convergence between the two groups. Using the SEO rank index, 
I find that the weighted average rank for white males was 46 in 1970 and 49 in 1980, 
demonstrating an increase in the skill level of employment (see Table 4). Breaking this down 
into a cohort from 26-45 year-olds and one from 46-65 year-olds, I find that the weighted 
occupational rank for Afrikaans speakers was higher for the 26-45 year-olds than for the 46-65 
year-olds in 1970 (45 vs. 41). The increase in skill rank indicates that the younger cohorts, who I 
have shown to be more educated, were more densely located in the higher skill occupations and 
also converging toward the English speakers (whose rank was 53).  
Evidence of Desegregation in South African manufacturing 
 The model suggests that the shift of whites into higher skilled occupations should have 
resulted in the desegregation of semi-skilled occupations. Although Africans constituted over 
70% of the total population by the 1970s, the proportion of Africans employed was substantially 
below this figure in most occupations as shown in table 5. Column 1 of table 5 shows that in 
1969 only 12.5 % of the occupations listed in the industry-wide Manpower survey employed 
Africans and whites in a proportion equivalent to that in the population. The remaining 
occupations comprised a (sometimes substantially) lower proportion of African workers. This 
proportion grew to 27.7 % by 1985; still suggesting significant segregation in the labor market. 
Nevertheless, the growth from 12.5 % to 27.7 % shows that African access to occupations rose 
during the 1970s. Column 2 shows that the increase in African employment included increased 
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access to higher skilled occupations as demonstrated by the increase in the weighted average 
African SEO skill rank from 27.22 in 1969 to 34.07 in 1985.14  
White incomes 
The primary incentive whites had to support desegregation was to maintain their skill 
premium. I now estimate whether skilled whites were able to maintain do so between 1970 and 
1980. I stack the 1970 and 1980 census data for white working men and estimate 
lnwagei = α + β1(white collar) +β2(educati) + β3t + β4 (white collar)*t + Г’X + εi        (2) 
where lnwagei is the log of white income, white collari is a categorical variable which is 
zero for blue-collar occupations and 1 for white-collar jobs and educati is a categorical variable 
representing the highest level of education a person has obtained.15 I include a year and 
occupation type interaction term to determine whether the return to white-collar workers 
increased after some desegregation had taken place. Xi is a vector of control variables such as 
age, home language, region and industry. The null hypothesis is that there was no decline in the 
skill premium between 1970 and 1980, that is, that β4 ≥ 0. 
Column 1 of table 6 shows the relationship between white-collar workers and incomes in 
1970 and 1980 for whites in manufacturing while column 2 reports the results for whites across 
all industries. Columns 3 and 4 include education as a control variable. The table shows that 
white collar workers in manufacturing did earn more than semi-skilled workers in 1970. I find 
that the difference between white and blue-collar declined by 1980; however, the result is 
significant for manufacturing workers only when I exclude education. The skill premium 
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therefore remained constant in the ten year period, consistent with the claim that skilled whites 
enabled desegregation in order to maintain the skill premium.   
Desegregation not related to industry economic conditions 
To remove any lingering doubt about the causes of desegregation, I test whether 
desegregation may nevertheless have been associated with industry specific economic 
conditions. I investigate the role of macroeconomic factors such as output, employment, and 
wage growth in contributing to desegregation. Using manufacturing industry data I estimate 
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where % ∆ indicates the growth rate of a variable, 
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represents the proportion of production 
workers who are African in time t, 
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L
−
represents the proportion of African production 
workers in the previous survey period, K/Li,t  is the capital labor ratio, and Yi,t  represents output. 
, 1A tW − represents average African wages in time t-1. t is a time trend, 1959 is an indicator variable 
that takes the value 0 from 1950 – 1958 and is one thereafter and 1970 is an indicator variable 
that takes the value 0 from 1959 – 1967 and is one thereafter (there were no censuses between 
1967 and 1970). The selection of the time dummies is consistent with the implementation of 
Section 77 of the IC Act in 1959 (after a legal dispute regarding the validity of Section 77) and 
the end of the period of the influence of Section 77. The last four terms are industry fixed effects, 
industry fixed effects interacted with the time indicators, as well as an error term.  
(3) 
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In a competitive labor market we expect industry output growth to be positively 
correlated with an increase in African employment since any increasing demand would have to 
be met by African workers. However, since whites constrained labor supply regardless of 
developments in labor demand, we expect to find no relationship between output growth and 
African employment growth. If the growth in African employment is unrelated to industry 
conditions we also expect to see no relationship of African employment to the capital labor ratio 
and the wage rate.   
Table 7 reports the results of the OLS regression. Although manufacturing economic 
conditions are significant, the size of the coefficients is small, indicating that a 1 % increase in 
the explanatory variables leads to a miniscule change in the growth rate of the proportion of 
African production workers. Only the percentage of African production workers in the previous 
period has any notable effect on the growth rate with a 1 % increase in the percent of African 
workers in the previous period leading to a decline in the growth rate of between 1.1 and 1.2 %. 
The capital labor ratio, output and wage bill all have a negligible impact on the growth rate of the 
proportion of African production workers. 
In contrast, the coefficient on the dummy variable for 1970 suggests an increase in the 
growth rate of 6 % from 1970. This result is consistent with the period of increasing 
desegregation in South African manufacturing and consistent with the idea that the increase in 
the employment of African workers was not a result of industry economic conditions. The result 
also indicates that the growth rate in the proportion of African workers increased some years 
prior to the increase in domestic and international opposition seen by 1973.  
Desegregation not related to changes in African characteristics 
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Equation 4 tests whether an increase in African education could be associated with 
improvements in African occupational attainment. For the determinants of African occupation 
rank I use census data to estimate: 
 0 1 'i i i iSEO educat Xβ β ε= + + Γ +              (4) 
 for each of the two census years, where SEOi denotes an individual’s occupation rank and 
educati is an indicator variable for the highest level of education obtained. I run the regression on 
economically active males. The census data show that the weighted average occupation rank for 
African workers increased four points, from 27 in 1970 to 31 in 1980. Changes in African 
education explain only a small part of the increasing African occupation rank. Substituting the 
difference in education between 1970 and 1980 (column 5 of Table 8) into regression equation 4 
whose coefficients are given in columns 2 and 3 of Table 8, I find that education is responsible 
for only 22% of the change in African occupation rank using the 1970 coefficients. Repeating 
this calculation for the 1980 coefficients, I find that educational improvements account for 24% 
of the increase in occupation rank. This implies that around 77% of the increase in African 
occupation rank remains unexplained. 
   An Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition of the causes of the gap between African and 
white occupational outcomes suggests that discrimination accounted for only 15.8 % of the gap 
in 1980, down from 26.5 % in 1970. Note, however, that the large explained gap in occupational 
attainment points to the extreme effect of pre-labor market discrimination in the form of 
differences in the provision of African and white education.  
 
5. Conclusion 
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 The desegregation of semi-skilled occupations in South African industries by the early 
1970s is remarkable in that it occurred in an environment where white workers had total control 
of the racial occupation distribution, at a time when white support for apartheid was high and 
before large scale increases in domestic and international opposition. This paper argues that as 
whites accumulated education they moved into more skilled occupations, and in order to 
maintain their skill premium, skilled workers forced a transition from racial segregation to 
integration in several complementary semi-skilled occupations. Such a transition was feasible 
due to the relative flexibility afforded white workers in the labor market through the IC Act of 
1956 that allowed whites to determine the level of job reservation. After desegregation, skilled 
whites would have remained protected from competition with Africans by the gap between 
African and white educational attainments. Changes in white characteristics do not imply a 
change in racial ideology; rather, white workers began to be affected by the economic constraints 
imposed by apartheid.  
 The paper also demonstrates that it is unlikely that any other factors such as economic 
conditions, international and domestic politics or changes in black characteristics could have 
been the causes of the desegregation that was taking place by the 1970s. These findings are 
consistent with the argument that the relaxation of job reservation was an adjustment in response 
to changing white socio-economic characteristics as noted in Lowenberg (1998).  
 With respect to the eventual dismantling of apartheid, it seems plausible that 
desegregating the semi-skilled occupations resulted in unexpected repercussions. In January 
1973, several industrial regions experienced a marked increase in labor unrest. It may well be 
that this unrest resulted from increased African awareness of their importance in the South 
African economy. Although the desegregation was driven purely by white economic incentives, 
20 
 
it may have set in motion the unintended and irreversible unraveling of apartheid as Africans 
began to play an ever more important role in South African economics that finally culminated in 
the advent of democracy in 1994.  
 The paper offers a broad explanation of the labor agreement process that led to 
desegregation. Future analysis of individual labor contracts will provide detailed information on 
the pace and extent of desegregation. Furthermore, the analysis will provide a more complete 
characterization of the white progression from semi-skilled work to skill work than the census 
data is able to do.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Educational attainment of Africans and Whites over the age of 16 (Afrikaans and English 
speaking) in percent, 1970 
Education African Afrikaans English 
None 51.96 1.48 0.76 
Primary 35.90 6.07 1.73 
Std 6/7 8.66 31.31 17.37 
Std 8/9 2.61 31.19 32.73 
Matriculation 0.38 18.95 30.88 
Diploma 0.47 7.14 10.88 
Bachelor 0.02 2.54 4.20 
Diploma and 
degree 
0.93 0.80  
Graduate  0.40 0.65 
Notes: None denotes no education, Primary means some primary school education was attained ranging from 1 year 
to 7 years, Std 6/7 implies either the first or the first two years of high school or obtained. Std 8/9 means either the 
third or fourth years of high school are obtained. Matriculation implies all five years of high school were completed. 
Bachelor refers to a Bachelors degree being attained, Graduate implies either a masters or PhD, a diploma may be 
earned by a person completing Standards 7, 8, 9 or matriculation. Some diplomas, mostly those that require 
matriculation may be converted into degrees with the addition of an extra year. While being a form of tertiary 
education, it is less prestigious than a degree.  
South African Central Statistical Service, 1970 Census Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Highest level of education attained in percent, Whites 1970 
 Year of birth (age): English speakers in 1970    
 1945 1935 1925 1915 1905 1895 1885 1871 
Education -1954 -1944 -1934 -1924 -1914 -1904 -1894 -1884 
 (16-25) (26-35) (36-45) (46-55) (56-65) (66-75) (76-85) (86-99) 
None 0.39 0.48 0.57 0.72 1.02 1.6 2.35 6.94 
Primary 0.79 0.91 0.57 1.28 2.53 5.28 8.82 15.28 
Std 6/7 11.15 9.77 15.83 18.93 26.76 32.52 34.71 36.11 
Std 8/9 37.72 33.42 32.23 31.51 30.5 26.38 25 20.83 
Matriculation 39.01 30.91 31.6 30.01 24.17 21.72 22.94 11.11 
Diploma 7.22 16.21 12.71 11.25 9.16 9.08 6.18 5.56 
Bachelor 3.18 6.36 4.77 4.62 3.68 2.21 0 2.78 
Diploma and 
degree 
0.5 1.17 0.78 0.95 0.9 0.74 0 0 
Graduate 0.04 0.78 0.93 0.72 1.27 0.49 0 1.39 
 Year of birth (age): Afrikaans speakers in 1970   
 
 
Education 
1945 1935 1925 1915 1905 1895 1885 1871 
-1954 -1944 -1934 -1924 -1914 -1904 -1894 -1884 
(16-25) (26-35) (36-45) (46-55) (56-65) (66-75) (76-85) (86-99) 
None 0.72 0.76 0.94 1.12 1.4 4.77 11.01 27.54 
Primary 2.05 1.35 2.82 5.39 14.99 26.13 33.94 40.58 
Std 6/7 17.49 23.91 33.4 47.45 51.26 44.27 38.99 20.29 
Std 8/9 42.97 35.76 32.13 22.91 16.07 10.5 8.03 5.8 
Matriculation 28.92 20.73 17.91 13.2 8.6 5.01 4.36 4.35 
Diploma 5.55 10.82 7.58 6.73 5.21 6.56 2.98 1.45 
Bachelor 1.74 4.56 3.12 2.16 1.07 1.79 0.46 0 
Diploma and 
degree 
0.5 1.51 1.41 0.65 0.86 0.6 0.23 0 
Graduate 0.06 0.59 0.7 0.39 0.54 0.36 0 0 
Notes: None denotes no education, Primary means some primary school education was attained ranging from 1 year 
to 7 years, Std 6/7 implies either the first or the first two years of high school or obtained. Std 8/9 means either the 
third or fourth years of high school are obtained. Matriculation implies all five years of high school were completed. 
Bachelor refers to a Bachelors degree being attained, Graduate implies either a masters or PhD, a diploma may be 
earned by a person completing Standards 7, 8, 9 or matriculation. Some diplomas, mostly those that require 
matriculation may be converted into degrees with the addition of an extra year. While being a form of tertiary 
education, it is less prestigious than a degree. 
South African Central Statistical Service, 1970 Census Data 
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Table 3  
Highest level of education attained in percent, Africans 1970 
 
Year of birth (age): Africans 1970  
Education 1945 
-1954 
(16-25) 
1935 
-1944 
(26-35) 
1925 
-1934 
(36-45) 
1915 
-1924 
(46-55) 
1905 
-1914 
(56-65) 
1895 
-1904 
(66-75) 
1885 
-1894 
(76-85) 
1871 
-1884 
(86-99) 
None 36.72 47.67 55.90 63.67 71.44 77.63 83.50 88.01 
Primary 43.83 36.85 32.92 28.65 23.53 18.90 13.45 10.12 
Std 6/7 14.35 10.68 7.87 5.63 3.86 2.69 2.47 1.45 
Std 8/9 4.30 3.65 2.29 1.24 0.68 0.45 0.30 0.26 
Matriculation 0.47 0.43 0.33 0.23 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.04 
Diploma 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bachelor 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Notes: None denotes no education, Primary means some primary school education was attained ranging from 1 year 
to 7 years, Std 6/7 implies either the first or the first two years of high school or obtained. Std 8/9 means either the 
third or fourth years of high school are obtained. Matriculation implies all five years of high school were completed. 
Bachelor refers to a Bachelors degree being attained, Graduate implies either a masters or PhD, a diploma may be 
earned by a person completing Standards 7, 8, 9 or matriculation. Some diplomas, mostly those that require 
matriculation may be converted into degrees with the addition of an extra year. While being a form of tertiary 
education, it is less prestigious than a degree. 
South African Central Statistical Service, 1970 Census Data 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4  
White weighted average occupation rank (SEO index) by skill in 1970 and 1980  
Weighted average 
SEO rank 
1970 1980 
26-45 years: Afrikaans 45 47 
English 53 54 
All 49 51 
46-65 years: Afrikaans 41 45 
English 52 53 
All 46 49 
Notes and Sources: I am weighting the average rank by the number of people employed in each occupation so that 
the rank not only gives an average for the occupations available but also takes into account the distribution of 
employment. 
South African Central Statistical Service, 1970 and 1980 Census Data 
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Table 5 
Increasing African Access to jobs and weighted average occupation skill rank for White and 
African workers, 1969-1985 (excluding agriculture and domestic service) 
 
Year 
Proportion of 
jobs >70% 
African 
Weighted average 
occupation skill rank 
White African 
1969 0.125 50.83 27.22 
1971 0.130 51.78 28.68 
1973 0.136 52.09 29.28 
1975 0.170 52.06 29.90 
1977 0.199 52.60 29.99 
1981 0.185 54.01 30.57 
1983 0.258 54.43 31.78 
1985 0.277 54.78 34.07 
Notes and Source: Africans made up around 70% of the South African population over this period.  
Occupation skill ranks are weighted by the employment in each occupation 
South African Central Statistical Service, Manpower Survey 
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Table 6  
OLS Relationship between skill and incomes, white males 1970 and 1980 
Dependent variable: 
lnwage 
Coef. 
Std. Err. 
Coef. 
Std. Err. 
Coef. 
Std. Err. 
Coef. 
Std. Err. 
White collar 0.345* 
(0.02) 
0.275* 
(0.01) 
0.174* 
(0.02) 
0.115* 
(0.01) 
White collar*1980 -0.062* 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.028 
(0.03) 
-0.030 
(0.02) 
Age 0.145* 
(0.00) 
0.166* 
(0.00) 
0.144* 
(0.00) 
0.157* 
(0.00) 
Age2 -0.002* 
(0.00) 
-0.002* 
(0.00) 
-0.002* 
(0.00) 
-0.002* 
(0.00) 
Primary   -0.200 
(0.18) 
0.161** 
(0.09) 
Standard 6 or 7   0.097 
(0.16) 
0.424* 
(0.08) 
Standard 8 or 9   0.281*
* 
(0.16) 
0.607* 
(0.08) 
Matriculation   0.455* 
(0.16) 
0.686* 
(0.08) 
Tertiary   0.670* 
(0.16) 
1.064* 
(0.08) 
Primary*1980   0.313 
(0.22) 
-0.225* 
(0.11) 
Standard 6 or 7*1980   -0.061 
(0.19) 
-0.230* 
(0.10) 
Standard 8 or 9*1980   -0.021 
(0.19) 
-0.175** 
(0.10) 
Matriculation*1980   -0.100 
(0.19) 
-0.137 
(0.10) 
Tertiary*1980   -0.058 
(0.19) 
-0.216* 
(0.10) 
1980 1.07* 
(0.03) 
1.33* 
(0.03) 
1.049* 
(0.19) 
1.420* 
(0.10) 
Constant 4.924* 
(0.07) 
4.405* 
(0.04) 
4.676* 
(0.17) 
3.947* 
(0.09) 
Industry effects Manf. All Manf. All 
R2 0.59 0.52 0.63 0.56 
N 6635 29073 6516 28756 
Notes: Primary means some primary school education was attained ranging from 1 year to 7 years, Std 6/7 implies 
either the first or the first two years of high school or obtained. Std 8/9 means either the third or fourth years of high 
school are obtained. Matriculation implies all five years of high school were completed. Tertiary refers to a 
Bachelors degree being attained, a masters or PhD, and/or a diploma. The white collar variable was constructed 
from the occupation data in the census. * denotes significance at 5%, ** denotes significance at 10%. 
Source: Central Statistical Service of South Africa, 1970 and 1980 Population Census 
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Table 7 
Determinants of the growth of the proportion of African production workers 
Dependent variable: 
growth proportion African 
production 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Proportion Africant-1 -1.19* 
(0.112) 
-1.11* 
(0.1) 
Capital labor ratiot-1 -0.002* 
(0.00) 
-0.002* 
(0.00) 
Capital labor ratio growtht -0.01* 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.00) 
Real net outputt-1 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Real net output growtht -0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
African wage bill/total wage 
billt-1 
0.13 
(0.13) 
 
African wage bill/total wage 
bill growtht 
0.01* 
(0.00) 
 
Average African wagest-1  -1.44 
(1.52) 
Average African wage 
growtht 
 -0.004** 
(0.00) 
Time 0.13 
(0.08) 
0.17* 
(0.08) 
1959 1.32 
(2.34) 
1.4 
(2.34) 
1970 5.96* 
(2.49) 
6.88* 
(2.43) 
Constant 71.86* 
(6.09) 
70.9* 
(6.58) 
R2 0.52 0.51 
Observations 327 327 
Notes: Interpret the continuous variables as a percentage increase in the RHS leads to an x percentage change in the 
LHS. The regression excludes 1958 as a result of a data discontinuity in the census. * denotes significance at 5%, ** 
denotes significance at 10%. 
Source: Central Statistical Service, Manufacturing Census 
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Table 8 
Effect of African Education on Occupation Rank, 1970 and 1980 
Dependent variable: 
SEO Rank 
1970 1980 African 
education % 
1970 
African 
education % 
1980 
Difference 
None - - 51.96 35.58 -16.38 
Primary 0.962* 
(0.11) 
0.855* 
(0.15) 
35.90 41.34 5.44 
Std 6/7 2.84* 
(0.19) 
3.739* 
(0.21) 
8.66 14.21 5.55 
Std 8/9 8.669* 
(0.32) 
8.49* 
(0.28) 
2.61 5.97 3.35 
Matriculation 14.365* 
(0.78) 
15.621* 
(0.49) 
0.38 1.77 1.39 
Tertiary 29.552* 
(0.74) 
28.654* 
(0.62) 
0.49 1.13 0.64 
R2 0.59 0.59    
N 15759 12888    
Industry and 
Employer Effects 
Yes Yes    
Notes: None denotes no education, Primary means some primary school education was attained ranging from 1 year 
to 7 years, Std 6/7 implies either the first or the first two years of high school or obtained. Std 8/9 means either the 
third or fourth years of high school are obtained. Matriculation implies all five years of high school were completed. 
Tertiary refers to a Bachelors degree being attained, a masters or PhD, and/or a diploma. * denotes significance at 
5%, ** denotes significance at 10%. 
Source: Central Statistical Service of South Africa, 1970 and 1980 Population Census 
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Figure 1 
Effect of increasing number of skilled workers on the skill premium under a fixed white 
population 
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Data Appendix      
Census data adjustments 
For comparability across the ten year period and between whites and Africans in 1970 I 
have had to make some adjustments to the census data. The occupation data for whites in 1970 
and all races in 1980 are compatible with the international standard occupation classification 
which consists of 284 unit level occupations grouped into 82 minor level occupations. In 1980 
the data for both races is given at the minor level. The 1970 data for whites is at the unit level, so 
I group the occupations into the minor categories to make the two years comparable.16 The 
African occupation data in 1970 is consistent with the minor level classification except that some 
unit level occupations are reported separately and several minor level occupations are grouped 
together. I reclassify occupations so that the data are consistent with those for whites and 1980. 
This procedure requires that I also make some adjustments to the SEO skill classification.17  
 There were similar problems with the industry data. The 1970 white data is at the 4 digit 
SIC level while the 1980 is at the 3 digit level. As with the occupation data the 1970 African 
industry data is slightly different from the white, including some industries at the 4 digit level 
and others at the 2-digit level. Regrouping to improve comparability, I end up with 73 industry 
classifications for both race groups. The adjustments were somewhat easier than for the 
occupation data as they did not involve assigning a skill rank.   
                                                 
16
 I also correct for mistakes in the coding manual in the 1980 occupation data. (For the interested reader, working 
proprietors in catering and accommodation are omitted from the coding manual but are included in the electronic 
data.) 
17
 Where several unit level occupations are listed, I group them together to form their minor level equivalent and 
create the SEO rank from the weighted average of the unit level ranks. For occupations that are at a more aggregate 
level than the minor level I choose the lowest minor level ranking since it is safe to assume that Africans were more 
likely to be employed in the lower ranking occupation. 
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 I correct for errors in the 1970 African education coding classification. I use the census 
questionnaire to recode the education data since the electronic coded data clearly are incorrect.18 
I then recode the data on highest level of educational attainment into six groups. The groups are 
no education, some amount of primary education (ranging from Grade 1 to Standard 5), 
Standards 6 or 7 (the first two years of high school), Standards 8 or 9 (the next two years of high 
school), matriculation (high school completion),19 and tertiary education. 
Finally, the income data for both 1970 and 1980 are in categories rather than income 
levels for each observation. I convert the categories to incomes by taking the midpoint of each 
category to be a person’s income. I adjust the 1980 data for inflation so that incomes are in real 
1970 Rand. However, I find that the nominal and real results do not differ significantly. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 For the interested reader, the data should be coded exactly as labeled in the questionnaire. That is for primary and 
secondary school 1 is no education, 2 is Sub A, 3 is Sub B, 4 – 8 are Standards 1-5 (primary school), 9 is Standards 
6-7, 10 is Standards 8-9, 11 is matriculation and 12 is unknown. Tertiary education also corresponds to the 
questionnaire, 0 is no tertiary, 1 is a diploma with Standard 9 or less, 2 is a diploma with matriculation, 3 and 4 or 
bachelors degrees, 5 is a masters degree and 6 is a PhD.  
19
 There are 12 years of school altogether – Grades 1 and 2 followed by Standard 1-9 and then matriculation, also 
called Standard 10. 
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SEO Index Construction 
Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman (1992) present a standard international Socio-
Economic index of Occupational Status (henceforth SEO index) that they derive for the 
International Standard Occupation classification. They use data on education, occupation and 
income for 73,901 full-time employed men from 16 countries to assign scores to the 284 
standard occupational unit groups from the IOS classification to maximize the role of occupation 
in explaining the link between education and income. By assigning a score to the return a worker 
earns from his level of education when he is employed in an occupation they are able to rank 
occupations by their return to education. From the scores assigned to the 284 three digit 
occupations they construct an aggregated index for the 82 two digit occupation groups also listed 
in the IOS classification. Their rank ranges from a low of 17 for agricultural workers to a high of 
90 for judges. The occupations listed in the South African population census correspond to the 2-
digit IOS classification and I assign each occupation its corresponding SEO index number. I 
assume that an occupation’s SEO number gives an indication of its skill level such that higher 
ranked occupations require workers to have a higher skill attainment. 
 
Table A1 
SEO Ranks as listed in Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman (1992) 
 
SEO 
rank 
Occupation 
(classified 
according to IOS 
minor groups) 
SEO 
rank 
Occupation 
(classified 
according to IOS 
minor groups) 
SEO 
rank 
Occupation 
(classified 
according to IOS 
minor groups) 
85 jurist  53 working proprietors 
(wholesale and 
retail) 
35 plumber welder etc 
80 economist, dip 
bachelor 
51 computer operator 34 metal processor 
72 legislative official 49 transport supervisor 34 spinner weaver etc 
71 medical dental 48 clerical not 
elsewhere classified 
34 paper & board 
35 
 
71 teacher  48 working proprietor 
(catering and 
accommodation) 
33 housekeeping 
69 accountant 48 police etc  33 shoemaker 
67 statistician 46 farm manager 33 rubber & plastic 
67 manager (not 
wholesale and 
retail) 
46 broadcasting 
operator 
33 stationary engine 
66 writer  44 production 
supervisor 
32 hairdresser etc 
65 life scientist 43 telephone telegraph 
operator 
32 miner quarrymen 
65 professional not 
elsewhere 
classified 
43 jewelry worker 32 food & beverage 
64 architect engineer 42 salesman  32 painter  
62 physical scientist 42 printer  32 construction not 
elsewhere classified 
60 clerical supervisor 41 manager (catering 
and 
accommodation) 
31 material handling 
59 aircraft ships 41 electrical fitter 30 fisherman hunter 
59 composer  40 service worker not 
elsewhere classified 
29 stone cutter 
59 insurance etc 40 tailor etc  29 glass clay etc 
58 government 
executive official 
40 toolmaker etc 29 production not 
elsewhere classified 
58 technical salesman 37 transport conductor 28 cook etc  
55 religious  37 tobacco preparer 26 farmer  
55 artist  36 mail clerk  26 wood & paper 
55 athlete  36 chemical processor 25 building caretaker 
54 stenographer 36 transport equipment 25 forestry worker 
54 bookkeeper 35 sales not 
elsewhere 
classified 
 24 launderer  
54 manager 
(wholesale and 
retail) 
35 cabinet maker 24 laborers not 
elsewhere classified 
54 sales supervisor 35 machinery fitter 17 agricultural worker 
 
 
 
